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Why did Hannah Arendt Reject the
Partition of Palestine?
Eric Jacobson
The political philosopher Hannah Arendt actively engaged in the problem of a
Jewish homeland and the politics of Zionism in the years 1941–1948. She
advocated a Binational solution to Palestine – a single political commonwealth
with two national identities, Jewish and Arab, integrated in a federation with
other countries in the region. In the crucial period leading up to the establish-
ment of the State of Israel, Arendt became increasingly disillusioned with the
Jewish Agency and the Zionist movement for failing to organize a Jewish
response to Nazism (a Jewish Army) and rejecting the Palestinian right to a
homeland.
Gardez-vous bien, Messieurs les Sionistes, un gouvernement passe, mais un
peuple reste.1
For more than two decades, Arendt was engaged with aspects of Jewish
thought and culture which today would not be unfamiliar to Jewish Studies.
Her writings from the late 1920s into the mid-1930s concerned German–Jewish
intellectual history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She worked
with the Zionist movement in France to help youth immigration to Palestine in
the 1930s and wrote extensively on Zionism in the 1940s. In the 1950s, her
research culminated in a major work on Antisemitism and its origins in colo-
nialism and race theory, The Origins of Totalitarianism. She was editor of
arguably the most important Judaic publisher, Salman Schocken, and contrib-
uted to the publication in English of works by Gershom Scholem, Franz Kafka,
1. Arendt (2007), p. 383. Trans: “Be very careful, Messieurs Zionists, governments come and go but
a people remain”, attributed to Nasif el Khalidi, who participated in the Arab-Jewish negotiations
of July 1914, Beirut. The phrase appears without citation. Arendt cites Moshe Perlmann as her
source, M. Perlmann “Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 1918-1922” in Jewish Social Studies,
April 1944. The same phrase is also quoted by Judah Magnes in a letter to Arendt (July 20, 1948),
again without an author. See Goren (1982), p. 503. Perlmann attributes the sentence to Nasif Bey
al Khalidi. Laqueur (2003) p. 226, attributes it to Nasif el Khalidi in discussion with a Dr Thon. Pre-
sumably this is Yaakov Thon, an associate of Zionist representative Arthur Ruppin. See also Medzini
(1928), p. 80.
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Bernard Lazare, and Walter Benjamin.2 The publication of The Origins of
Totalitarianism launched her academic career in the United States and with it
came a deepening interest in political philosophy and a decline in Jewish mat-
ters. Two major disappointments contributed to this. The first was her disillu-
sionment with Zionism, culminating in her sharp rebuke of the movement for
failing to resolve the Arab question. The second was the reception of her book
Eichmann in Jerusalem, a study of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, the Holocaust
and the problem of moral responsibility. After 1964, her attention moved
entirely to other matters and she was not to focus on Jewish questions again.
In the period 1941–1948, Arendt’s political and intellectual work was largely
dedicated to Zionism. Her views on Jewish political action were as rich and
nuanced as any of her later political ideas, further complicated by the fact
that from 1941 to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Jewish his-
tory was remarkably tumultuous, with many surprising turns that had a consid-
erable impact on the prospects for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine and a resolution of the Arab–Jewish conflict. Her activities in France
on behalf of Jewish emigration to Palestine are known. However, the path
from passionate advocacy of Jewish politics to what became essentially a cri-
tique of Zionism remains obscure and somewhat difficult to follow. She rallied
for the establishment of an independent Jewish army to fight Nazism, criti-
cized the Zionist movement for endorsing a single Jewish commonwealth and
campaigned instead for a Binational solution in Palestine – a single political
entity with two national identities, Jewish and Arab, which would exist in a
federation with other countries in the region. She grew increasingly skeptical
of the prospects for peace and yet her ideas on Jews and Judaism provided
the underlying framework for her mature work on politics and morality, as
Bernstein has shown (Bernstein 1996). The following essay is a reconstruction
of Arendt’s arguments from the 1940s – from the series of articles for Aufbau,
the German language newspaper published in Manhattan, to the establishment
of the State of Israel in May 1948 and her gradual disillusionment.3
Jewish Politics
Arendt left Berlin in 1934 after her arrest and brief imprisonment. She had
been working on a mission by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the organization
pioneering Jewish settlement, in the National Library in Berlin to make a
record of Antisemitic public statements. The work was lost but she managed
to escape over the Czech border, and then onward to Paris.4 From 1934–1940,
she was the chair of the French Youth Aliyah Committee, helping young Jews
2. By 1948, the Schocken Library in New York had published other important Jewish authors in
English translation including Nahum Glatzer, Yitzhak Baer, S.D. Goitein, Heinrich Heine, Solomon
Maimon, Martin Buber and S.Y. Agnon.
3. The German-language Aufbau articles are collected, save for two, in Arendt (2000).
4. Young-Bruehl (2004).
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escape to Palestine and continued to be identified as a “special delegate of
the Jewish Agency for Palestine for emigrants from Central Europe” in the
author’s index of the Menorah Journal which published her most important
article of the period, “Zionism Reconsidered” (Autumn 1945).5 Arendt escaped
from Paris with her mother and her husband Heinrich Blu¨chner, in part due to
the efforts of journalist Varian Fry and the Marseilles office of the Emergency
Rescue Committee and arrived in New York in May 1941.6
To Arendt, the term Zionism meant simply Jewish politics. In the history of
Antisemitism that Arendt presents as both the groundwork and the antecedent
of totalitarianism in the Origins of Totalitarianism, she characterizes the Jews
as a people at a loss for power, always at the mercy of more powerful forces,
never the makers of their own destiny. Her position clashes with the Hegelian
view of history, or Rosenzweig’s quixotic reply that places the Jews outside of
history, or even Benjamin’s vision of the generations and epochs to come that
shapes his understanding of time.7 For Arendt, European Jewish life and cul-
ture was bereft of politics and barren of the means to engage with the world.
Jewish politics meant to Arendt a political response to the powerlessness of
Jewish history and her appeal to the development of such a politics in Judaism
was an attempt to orient herself to issues of her day: Antisemitism, tolerance,
assimilation, and national self-determination or Zionism. Zionism here is not
what one might expect in the broader history of the movement and her
approach does not follow the dominant tendencies of Central European Jews
in her time. She is neither a member of a German Zionist youth group, nor the
cultural circles that cultivated the idea of a “rejuvenation of Judaism.” Her
first engagement with Zionism began practically while in exile in Paris. As a
consequence, she has no connection to the Cultural Zionism of Ahad Haam,
the pen name of Asher Ginsberg (1856–1927) whose Hebrew prose inspired
scores of German-speaking Jewish intellectuals in the early twentieth century.8
The enthusiasm engendered by Ahad Haam for a cultural renewal of Judaism
was coupled with the revival of Hebrew to be read and spoken within Europe.
In some instances, this cultural movement overlapped with the new social
communities in Palestine and the Kibbutz movement. However, among the
Cultural Zionists as a whole, the idea of an independent Jewish state garnered
5. Arendt (2007), pp. 343-374. It was published in the Autumn 1945 edition of the Menorah Jour-
nal, not in the previous year (October 1944) as per Arendt (2007), p. xxxix. For Arendt’s descrip-
tion in the Author’s Index, see The Menorah Journal, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, October–December 1945
(Autumn 1945), p. 263.
6. The committee was first established months before, on 13 August 1940; see Brown (2000). See
also Young-Bruehl (2004), p. 164.
7. On Rosenzweig, Hegel and history, see Ste´phane Mose`s, The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, Ben-
jamin, Scholem, Stanford University Press, 2009 and my comments at Notre Dame Philosophical
Reviews: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=18006/. On Benjamin’s messianism, see Jacobson
(2009).
8. She makes a passing remark, if somewhat negative, which is presumably about Ahad Haam, lit.
“einer aus dem Volk” – “one of the people,” a literal translation of the pen name ‘Ahad Haam.’
Arendt (2000), p. 35.
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little to no support, as did the imperial politics of Theodor Herzl (1860–1904),
the founder of Political Zionism. Arendt’s Zionism falls on neither side of this
cultural and political divide. On the one hand, she shows no interest in Ahad
Haam with Hebrew never becoming native to her despite her predilection for
classical languages and mastery of many modern European ones. On the other
hand, she repudiated Herzl’s colonial approach and the central tenants of his
ideology. Although her Jewish politics were practical rather than cultural, she
shared no affinity with an imperial politics of a bygone age, as she wrote in
1942:
Jewish politics, to the extent that it exists at all, is run by people who have
likewise grown up – without ever growing powerful! – worshipping power and
opportunistic success. Their abhorrence for principles, their fear of betting on
the wrong horse, their admiration of those who hold power on this earth, and
their reluctance to mobilize the energies of their own people have cost us the
deployment of a Jewish army.9
The absence of politics in Jewish history speaks to the operative distinction
in Arendt’s early work between two character types, the pariah and the par-
venu. The first category pertains to the Jewish gadflies of Western culture
whose experience of the Enlightenment imbued them with a certain degree
of skepticism toward the promises of nationhood and tolerance of liberalism.
They had earlier been led into the promises of Enlightenment and away from
Jewish particularity, seeking a place for Judaism in the adoption of true com-
mon values and identities. Arendt’s foremost example of the pariah is the
French socialist Bernard Lazare. The second category pertains to the parvenu
who has learned the same history but derived the opposite lesson. The only
salvation for the Jew, not as “one of the people” but clearly as a liberal indi-
vidual entity, is to make oneself available to the forces of power and to avail
oneself of them. Her chief parvenu is Benjamin Disraeli who appears in the
first part of the Origins of Totalitarianism asserting the rule and expansion of
the British Empire.10 Though the pariah–parvenu motif appeared first in an
essay published in April 1944,11 it can be shown to be an underlying concern
in her study of the intellectual salons of nineteenth-century Berlin through
the eyes of Rahel Varnhagen (1771–1883), the subject of Arendt’s intellectual
biography (1957). These questions continued to occupy Arendt for most of the
Jewish Studies period, and although it functions clearly as a rudimentary his-
toriography, these political-philosophical observations became the framework
for her later thoughts on politics and the vita activa, a life which is formed
by an engagement with the world.12 In the passage above, the emphasis is on
9. “Jewish Politics”, unpublished fragment, 1942, Arendt (2007), p. 242.
10. See “The Potent Wizard” from Chapter 3 “The Jews and Society” in Arendt (1951).
11. “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition” in Arendt (2007), pp. 275-297.
12. Vita activa is the original and ultimately German title of Arendt, The Human Condition, Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1958; Vita activa oder Vom ta¨tigen Leben, Mu¨nchen: Piper Ver-
lag, 2002.
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the longing of a people who were denied any realm of public autonomy and
were so accustomed to standing in the shadows of history that they no longer
knew what it meant to be acting in the world. In contrast, politics suggests
an engagement with the world under conditions that present themselves, not
the wished-for longings of pristine circumstances to come but practical action
within time itself.
The Politics of a Jewish Army
Beyond any practical Zionist activity in the 1930s in support of emigration from
Europe, Arendt’s desire for a Jewish politics began with her advocacy of a
Jewish army. The idea of establishing an independent Jewish martial force to
oppose Hitler first appeared in the pages of the Aufbau and is entwined with
her notion of Jewish politics.13 In November 1941, she wrote that Jewish his-
tory had placed a premium on Dasein (existence) over national and religious
aims, and it was for this very reason that a Jewish army was necessary. No one
can help the Jews if they do not help themselves and they can only learn to
defend themselves by responding to that which actually threatens them. What
followed was Arendt’s claim that a Jew can only defend herself as a Jew, not
as an Englishman or Frenchman – a consistent but somewhat troublesome
argument that remained her position throughout her life.14 What constitutes a
Jewish Dasein was the politics of a reply, not on wishful terms, but on the
terms that have been given. Yet how the politics of a reply can be reduced to
the terms of her opponent, the Antisemite, is somewhat puzzling and resem-
bles the problem of contingency in Sartre’s Antisemite and Jew.15 Since it has
been proven time and again that is not necessary for a Jew to be present in a
particular place for there to be Antisemitism, it is clear that Antisemitism can-
not be dependent on the Jews. Moreover, in a conventional and juridical
sense, rights are not defended on the terms by which they are denied but on
pre-existing principles. It is fortunate that it is so, for it is just as difficult to
dispel a falsehood regarding persons and prejudices as it is to prove a nega-
tive. It is not possible, for example, to argue that because the water-wells of
Europe are not poisoned, the Jews are not as hateful as Luther claimed.16
Arendt’s argument is however neither existential nor performative. It concerns
the absence of the subject as a participant in her own history. This is else-
13. It is also undeniably intertwined with Heidegger, a topic which exceeds the framework for dis-
cussion here. See Villa (1996).
14. Arendt (1994) pp. 1-23.
15. Sartre (1948).
16. Martin Luther, Von den Juden und ihren Lu¨gen, 1543.
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where expressed as Philosophie ohne Gela¨nder – a political philosophy
informed by the conditions as given to us in the world. The “existence of a
people” (Existenz) is too important to be left to the whims of a few rich and
powerful men. It must be had by the people themselves, old and young, men
and women, in one collective form of resistance. Stateless people stand out-
side of the law, she writes in November 1941, and their fundamental illegiti-
macy (Rechtlosigkeit) cannot be repaired by naturalization: “The question is
different for us Jews without nationalities from Europe, as we are merely tol-
erated everywhere as refugees and exist nowhere with rights and powers.”17
Her position on the necessity of a Jewish politics emerged from her search for
a Jewish character or characteristics that animates her Habilitationsschrift on
Rahel Varnhagen. Despite her defence of a Jewish army based on the need to
establish a Jewish politics on the actual Gela¨nder or ‘stair-landings’ of the
twentieth century, she was not persuaded by the argument that the absence
of a politics suggests the lack of existence, existence being the conditionality
of Dasein or “being somewhere.” The Jew is not the invention of the
Antisemite or the product of economic conditions.18 The idea that the moon is
the only place free of Antisemitism lends Zionism an element of lunacy, she
argued, for there is no solution to the “Jewish problem in one country, also
not in Palestine.”19 Already percolating here is the view that Antisemitism is a
political idea, not merely a cultural or biological theory. For this reason, it will
require more than a territorial solution. The Jews need to “be somewhere” to
fight European fascism. As exiles, they are everywhere but present nowhere.
That “somewhere” is not a landmass but a unified and collective resistance to
Hitler, a Jewish Army. In her series on Die Krise des Zionismus, written in Ger-
man from October to November 1942 and serialized in three parts for Aufbau,
Arendt calls for a “Gleichberechtigte Beteilung am Krieg,” an “equal participa-
tion in the war” or an equality in war that was yet to be afforded to the Jews
in peacetime.20 An independent Jewish army was that much more necessary,
she wrote, as the formal structures of political Zionism collapsed.
The failure to attract support for a Jewish army is also the focus of “The
Crisis in Zionism,” an unpublished English text from February 1943, not to be
confused with the German articles with the same title.21 “The Crisis of Zion-
ism” is noticeably different from the German version and is a good indication
how rapidly her thinking was changing during the fateful years of 1942–1943 at
the height of the Nazi extermination campaign and crucial years for the Zionist
17. Arendt (2000), p. 25; “Anders steht die Frage fu¨r uns ju¨dische Staaenlosen aus Europa, da wir
flu¨chtlinge u¨berall nur als Duldung und nirgends kraft rechts leben.” Arendt (2000), p. 36.
18. Arendt (2000), p. 30.
19. Op cit.
20. Op cit.
21. “Die Krise des Zionismus” appeared in the column “This Means You” of Aufbau on 22 October,
6 November, and 20 November, 1942; reprinted in Arendt (2000), pp. 94-104.
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movement with regard to the Arab–Jewish conflict. The crisis to which she
referred was nothing less than a “crisis of Judaism,” a “catastrophe of the last
years [that] was accompanied by a deep and dangerous crisis of Jewish poli-
tics.”22 Her characteristically forceful and, at times, sardonic comments
emerged from what she understood to be the failure of the world Jewish com-
munity to support the formation of an independent Jewish fighting force and
respond to the conflict in Palestine. The inability to create an autonomous
force to oppose Nazism, the historical weakness in Judaism for which the Jew-
ish Agency, the institutional representation of the Jewish community, was par-
ticularly to blame. The Jewish Agency failed to back an independent Jewish
resistance to National Socialism and was equally feeble in its response to the
European refugee program. Instead, it endorsed the formation of a Jewish Bri-
gade within the ranks of the British Armed Forces. This lack of Jewish politics,
Arendt argued, reflected the inability of the Jewish people to respond. Without
the capacity to anticipate the years to come, she saw these failures of leader-
ship as “a considerable blow to the idea of a Jewish homeland.” The Jewish
Agency, which served as the “only representative of the Jewish people,”
appeared largely unconcerned with the necessity of its own defense.23 A Jew-
ish army, and not merely a brigade of a colonial power, was “the only guaran-
tee” that what was established “during the war” would help provide for “our
demands after the war.” “If the promises of governments in exile are problem-
atic, the future protection of Jewish rights in Palestine is equally problem-
atic.”24
The charge to found a Jewish army had been a firm position of Arendt’s
thinking since November 1941 and by February 1943, she had watched the idea
be progressively eviscerated. It was a considerable blow to Arendt that the call
was poorly received by Jewish leadership. More disconcerting was the fact that
in the absence of leadership by the Jewish Agency, the idea had been com-
mandeered by the revisionist wing of the Zionist movement, the followers of
Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940). While the mainstream Zionist movement
stalled, the revisionist wing had taken over the “Committee for a Jewish Army
for Palestinian and Stateless Jews” which had originally formed at the start of
1942 with the support of like-minded liberal thinkers. By February 1943, it had
become an organ of the revisionist movement, the supporters of the Irgun, the
Jewish underground army in Palestine noted for its anti-Arab stance – a “fas-
cist organization,” wrote Arendt, and a few years later qualified as “a terror-
ist, right-wing, chauvinist organization” in an open letter to the New York
Times.25 As the idea of a Jewish Army offered no meaningful resistance to Hit-
ler and became merely a mirror of the politics of Palestine, her attention
22. “The Crisis of Judaism” in Arendt (2007), p. 330.
23. Arendt (2007), p. 331.
24. Arendt (2007), p. 332.
25. Arendt (2000), p. 38. See also her “New Palestine Party. Visit of Menachem Begin and Aims of
Political Movement Discussed”, New York Times, 4 December, 1948. The open letter was co-signed
by Albert Einstein, Seymour Melman, Sidney Hook and Rabbi Jessurun Cardozo.
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turned progressively to what she deemed as the crisis within the ideology of
Zionism.
Biltmore and the Crisis of Zionism
In May 1942, an international Zionist congress was held at the Biltmore Hotel,
once located above Grand Central Station at 42nd Street in New York City. The
conference resolutions, known as the Biltmore Program, sounded the death-
knell for a Jewish army as well as Jewish–Arab reconciliation. “The Crisis of
Zionism” (February 1943), she wrote rather programmatically,
means that Herzl’s vision is urgently in need of revision; that we stand before
the task of reformulating our right to Palestine; that our relations with Britain
must be formulated anew; that our hopeless attachment to the Balfour Decla-
ration and mandate system, which no longer exists, leads nowhere politically
and that we are not even capable of mumbling in the language of the common
man …26
The conflict that was to emerge from the resolutions of the conference helped
to unravel the ideological state of Zionism to Arendt: Zionism clings to the
past with regard to Herzl’s appeal to the imperial powers with the aim of
achieving a Jewish homeland.27 The same principle is at work with regard to
the British Mandate power, which no longer operated from the principles of
the Balfour Declaration (1917) that once awarded the territory of Palestine to
the Jews. The conference revealed to Arendt he degree to which Zionism oper-
ates as the politics of plutocrats who have nothing to say to the common man.
The two most contentious resolutions from the Biltmore Program were Article
6, which rejected the British White Paper of 1939 and any limit to Jewish emi-
gration to Palestine, and Article 8, which resolved for the first time in any
Zionist congress, “that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth”
without any corresponding reference to the Arab Palestinians.28 These resolu-
tions introduced a division into the movement, she argued, rupturing the gen-
eral consensus among Jewry worldwide regarding the principle of territorial
compromise and regional cooperation in Palestine. It threw the principle of
international Jewish solidarity – “Ganz Israel bu¨rgte fu¨reinander,” as she
wrote, “All Israel is responsible for one another” – into question, presenting a
radical divide within the Zionist movement.29 The rejection of the program by
26. Arendt (2000), pp. 97-98; translation modified from Arendt (2007), p. 180.
27. See also “The Jewish State: Fifty Years After, Where have Herzl’s Politics Led?” in Arendt
(2007), pp. 375-387.
28. The Biltmore Program, “Declaration adopted by the Extraordinary Zionist Conference at the
Biltmore Hotel of New York City, 11 May 1942”.
29. The title of her article published in Aufbau on 24 April 1942, a few weeks before the Biltmore
Conference, suggesting that the question of solidarity was already on her mind. See Arendt (2000),
p. 51; Arendt (2007), p. 154, although the translation is modified.
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some American Zionists, in particular the American Jewish Committee, served
as the grounds of her remaining optimism.30 Arendt staked great hope in the
Jews of America and with the enthusiastic ring of a recent immigrant, she
praised her American counterparts for their freedom from the class hierarchies
of Europe. Underlying this hope in the classlessness of American society is
Arendt’s persistent view that there is a primary conflict between the Jewish
national movement and its leadership. It was this perceived aversion to cen-
tralization in American Jewry to which Arendt staked claim.31
In Palestine, opposition to the Biltmore Program was also the basis upon
which several new groups were formed. The Ihud (Unity) movement, founded
in 1942 by the American rabbi and founding rector of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Judah Magnes,32 was made up predominantly of academics who had
been working for reconciliation and understanding since the foundation of the
university, and the first binationalist organization, Brit Shalom (Covenant of
Peace) in 1923–1925. Brit Shalom which began in 1923 and had largely dissi-
pated by the early 1930s, served as a precursor to Ihud (Heller 2003). The turn
of policy at Biltmore in favor of a single Jewish state in Palestine, previously
the domain of the extremists in the Zionist movement, took many in this circle
by surprise. Magnes, for one, suggests he knew nothing of the resolutions until
“Mr Ben-Gurion brought them in his pocket upon his return to Palestine in
November [1942].”33 Ihud fiercely opposed the unilateral declaration of a sin-
gle Jewish commonwealth, which it saw as “equivalent, in effect, to a declara-
tion of war by the Jews on the Arabs.”34 Ihud supported a single Arab–Jewish
state with communal organizations and local associations in which Jewish emi-
gration, in the first instance, would be matched to equal the Arab population.
The aim would be to represent two equal parts in a binational political confed-
eration.35 By 6 October 1942, Magnes and the Ihud circle began to feature in
Arendt’s articles for Aufbau.36 In December 1943 she penned a two-part article
30. The American Jewish Committee, a civil rights organization, formed in 1906 by German-Jewish
immigrants, opposed the resolutions at Biltmore and as a result, left the American Jewish Confer-
ence in 1943.
31. Arendt (2000), p. 99.
32. A short bibliography of Ihud includes: Magnes, Like all the Nations? Jerusalem: Weiss Press
(Herod’s Gate), 1930; Judah L. Magnes and Martin Buber, The Bond: Pamphlets of the Group ‘The
Bond’, Jerusalem Vol. 1, Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, April 1939; Magnes, Jewish Arab Co-Operation in
Palestine [Union Pamphlets No. 3 October 1945] Jerusalem: Ihud (Union) Association, 1945, (p. 16);
M. Buber, J.L. Magnes, E. Simon, ed., (1947) Toward Union in Palestine: Essays on Zionism and
Jewish-Arab Cooperation, Jerusalem: Ihud (Union) Association, 1947, (p. 96).
33. Magnes, Letter to Alexander Dushkin, January 7, 1943, published in Goren (1982). See also Dan-
iel (2010) and Heller (2003, p. 31).
34. Magnes, “America Must Impose a Compromise”, from a journal entry from August 30, 1942,
published in Goren (1982), p. 382.
35. Magnes (1947), pp. 19-20): “I am hoping that with the developments of the next six months, before
the Zionist Congress takes place, there will be a greater measure of calm and understanding. But if we
simply keep reaffirming what the Biltmore programme began, and simply shake our fists and say to
Great Britain, You are our enemy, and say to the Arabs, You are our enemy – that is what we are saying
to them at the present time – … why then of course the situation will go from bad to worse.”
36. On Magnes, see Brinner and Rischin (1987).
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on the question of whether the Jewish–Arab question could be solved with the
Ihud proposal for regional federation. While the main Zionist congress afforded
the current majority – the Arabs – minority rights, the Ihud group wanted to
preserve the rights of a Jewish minority in a greater Arab commonwealth. Not
quite satisfied with this aspect of minority-majority politics, she began with
criticism of Ihud. The experience of Europe had shown that national problems
cannot be solved by national politics, she wrote, and the First World War did
nothing to solve Europe’s national questions. European minorities still contin-
ued to harbor irredentist claims, with little change since 1918. With a certain
degree of political clairvoyance, she concluded in the winter of 1943, that the
only solution to Europe’s ethnic conflicts would be a federated system in which
the self-determination of national groups would be separated from the idea of
the state. A future federated Europe would also provide the groundwork for a
resolution of Europe’s Jewish question with a formal recognition of Jewish
nationality independent of statehood. The model for ethnic and regional feder-
ation advocated by Ihud was not very far from this. According to Ihud, the only
possible means to ensure a Jewish homeland would be within an Arab federa-
tion of the Middle East, federation being the watchword of their political com-
monality in contrast to the currents expressed at Biltmore. A federation may
offer some political autonomy for a Jewish homeland, said Arendt, whereas
the discourse of majority and minority rights was destined to dissipate into a
politics of communalism and calls for “population transfers” which would
“never work without fascist organizations.”37 A genuine federal solution to the
Arab–Jewish conflict – a model in which clearly identifiable national identities
are bound together in a state – would be possible because the majority–
minority problems, insolvable in themselves, would be set aside and replaced
by a federated politics such as in the United States of America. “The only real-
istic position,” she wrote in May 1944, “would be a policy of alliances with
other Mediterranean peoples, which would strengthen the Jewish status in Pal-
estine and secure the active sympathies of our neighbors.”38 The position of
the mainstream Zionist congress – that the Arabs of Palestine have numerous
countries to which they could be resettled, in which they constitute a major-
ity, while the Jews would have one country, in which, though presently a
minority, they will become a majority – was obviously a sham. It set up an
unsolvable conflict, as she wrote in August 1944.39
There are moments in her critique of Palestine politics that are difficult to
understand today, particularly where she is critical of allies that are other-
wise nearest to her positions. One of these instances is her critical comments
regarding how removed Ihud remained from the mainstream Jewish workers
and cooperative movement in Palestine, a position that she understood to
be politically suicidal. She favored instead the League for Jewish-Arab
37. Arendt (2007), p. 195.
38. Arendt (2007), p. 206.
39. Arendt (2000), p. 158; Arendt (2007), p. 220.
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Rapprochement and Understanding, which had built a base of support among
workers and intellectuals in Hashomer Hazair, Kedmah Mizrahah, the Mapai
party and the general Zionist movement, whereas Ihud was backed by the pri-
vate money of “plantation owners.”40 The strength of the League was found
in their own newspaper, Mishmar, which attempted to propagate a conviction
in Binationalism despite the resistance to reconciliation in the yishuv (the
Jewish community of Palestine) following the outbreak of the Arab Riots of
1936–1939.
Her criticism, however, was ill-informed, as the League and Ihud were part
of the same Binationalist movement and made up of many of the same individ-
uals including Gad Frumkin, Pinhas Rutenberg, Moshe Novomeysky, Henrietta
Szold, Joseph Moshe Valero, Martin Buber, Ernst Simon, Haim Margolis-Kalvary-
ski, and Moshe Smilansky, presumably the unnamed “plantation owner” who
had been in Palestine since the 1890s.41 It was the same circle, generally
speaking, with a common orientation. All of these individuals and organizations
supported a Binationist solution to the Jewish–Arab conflict in Palestine. Like
Arendt, they were incensed by the resolutions at Biltmore and did not wish to
see the Jewish homeland become a colonial project or an arm of an imperial
power. Although clearly active in different sectors of society, they all envi-
sioned a confederated and regional solution to the conflict.
Federation and Jewish–Arab Binationalism
The idea of a Binational Palestine meant for Arendt a “Jewish national home,”
rather than a Jewish national state, and this difference is revealing. Despite
her endorsement of a common politics, a territorial anchor and a means of
martial force, she advocated no centralized framework of state power. This
corresponds to the views expressed in what she refers to as the “Magnes decla-
ration,” presumably the founding document of Ihud, a response to the resolu-
tions at Biltmore, which was drawn up in August–September 1942 and released
to the press in October.42 The Ihud declaration sought a new, independent
government in Palestine based upon “equal political rights for the two peo-
ples,” campaigning for agreement among the “whole Jewish people to a Feder-
ative Union of Palestine and neighboring countries” which would “guarantee
40. Arendt (2007), p. 221. See Heller (2003).
41. Sofer (1998) presents Ihud and the Binational movement as unrealistic. This, he argues, history
has proven. But any approach to Jewish history that even remotely intimates “what is rational is
actual and what is actual is rational” deserves our skepticism.
42. “Ichud Party Issues Declaration; Not Anti-zionist but Opposes Jewish State.” Jewish Telegraphic
Agency, 6 October 1942.
ARENDT ON PALESTINE 11
the national rights of all the peoples within it,” and to be part of a union with
England and America, a “Union of the free peoples” which would “bear the
ultimate responsibility for the establishment and stability of international rela-
tions in the New World after the war.”43 Later, by 1944–1945, in a pamphlet
entitled Jewish Arab Co-Operation in Palestine, Magnes narrowed Ihud’s pro-
gram to two key points:
(1) That the basis for policy in Palestine be the creation of a bi-national Pales-
tine, in which both peoples, Jews and Arabs, are to have equal rights and
duties. Conversely this means that there is to be no Jewish State and no Arab
State of Palestine.
(2) That the international background of Palestine be emphasized and rein-
forced, and that to this end Great Britain declare its readiness, under suit-
able conditions, to bring Palestine under the Trusteeship System of the
United Nations, and that Palestine thus become a Trust Territory instead of
a Mandated Territory.44
The trusteeship that Magnes envisioned would be a greater regional feder-
ation entrusted with establishing a ruling policy for Palestine and guarantee-
ing its security under Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations. Under
the auspices of the UN, the trusteeship would include Great Britain, the
Arab League, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine: “Great Britain represents
the Christian world, the Arab League represents the Arab world, and the
Jewish Agency the Jewish world, at least in reference to Palestine.”45 Great
Britain, wrote Magnes, would be designated under Article 81 of the UN
Charter as an Administering Authority, not a colonial power but a coordinat-
ing body which would include Jewish and Arab high officers. Palestine would
be included in an Arab federation and in that capacity form part of an
Anglo-American alliance.
Ihud’s rejection of the Biltmore program and endorsement of a Binational
state appeared to Arendt as a “direct challenge to the Jewish Agency,” as was
another organization by the name of Aliyah Hadashah (New Emigration).46 Ali-
yah Hadashah, like Ihud, was also formed in 1942 in response to the Biltmore
resolution for a single Jewish state in Palestine. Aliyah Hadashah, under the
leadership of Georg Landauer and Pinchas Rosen (Felix Rosenblueth), repre-
sented a voice for the German-speaking emigrants from central Europe who
43. Op cit. Founding document of Ihud. See Mendes-Flohr (1983). The document is dated August
11, 1942, and this appears to be the date of the first meeting of Ihud, attended by roughly a hun-
dred Jewish intellectuals. See Kotzin (2010), p. 282. However, before the Anglo-American commis-
sion of 1947, Magnes testified that “The Ihud (Union) Association was formed in September 1942.”
(16 September 1942). See Magnes and Buber (1947), p. 10.
44. Magnes (1945), section 5, p. 6.
45. Op cit.
46. Arendt (2007), p. 333.
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were new to Palestine. Like Ihud, it saw itself, in the words of Georg Landa-
uer’s founding document, to be “a movement and not a party, certainly not a
party in a traditional Zionist sense.”47 There were indeed many similarities
between Aliyah Hadashah and Arendt’s views. The organization stood for the
“fight for a Jewish army, for Jewish units and Jewish symbols,” which it took
to be an entirely just cause.48 Like Arendt, Landauer saw the turn at Biltmore
as an endorsement of a “politics of suicide,” seeing Arab–Jewish conflict in
Palestine as “a multifaceted national problem that must be carefully managed
and similarly solved with international forces. Aliyah Hadashah is therefore
opposed to the prevailing Zionist isolationism…”49 Markedly vague in its call
with regard to “respecting the Arab people,” Landauer stressed the lack of
desire on the part of a German-speaking Jewish emigrant to colonize the Arabs
of Palestine: “Our goal is not the political domination of the Arabs but rather
the great colonization of the Jews.” To this effect, Aliyah Hadashah proposed:
“That we do not want to oppress any Arab farmer or worker, nor do we want
to limit Arab autonomy. On the contrary, our aim is to create new and addi-
tional economic positions and to seek rights to the land that we have worked
ourselves.”50 Gerda Luft, the widow of the assassinated libertarian socialist
leader of the Jewish Agency, Chaim Arlosoroff, who was a member of its exec-
utive committee, wrote the following description of the movement:
Mid-way between the working-class parties and the bourgeois groups comes the
“Aliyah Hadasha”. Though founded but a few years ago, it emerged the second
strongest party in the Yishuv from the 1944 elections for the Assefat Ha-Nivha-
rim, whilst in the Zionist congress elections, held in October 1946, Aliyah
Hadasha proved the strongest central party. In recent years, it attracted atten-
tion and hostility, mainly because of its unequivocal repudiation of the use of
force in politics. Despite the antagonism and threatened position resulting
from this attitude, there was no deviation from this stand. The political aims
of the Aliyah Hadasha are: the safeguarding of sufficient immigration; the abo-
lition of the existing land-laws and the securing of the necessary possibilities
for the development of the Zionist colonisation work, in addition to a strength-
ening of Jewish autonomy in the country. The party has fought the Biltmore
programme as being illusory and politically harmful. Whilst proclaiming Jewish-
Arab understanding as one of the most important aims of Zionist policy, it has
47. “eine Bewegung, aber keine Partei, jedenfalls keine Partei im Traditionallen zionistischen
Sinne.” Georg Landauer, “Alija Chadascha. Eine neue politische Formation”, first published in der
Schriftenreihe der Alija Chadascha (Nr. 1, Tel Aviv 1944), reprinted in Der Zionismus im Waldel
dreier Jahrzehnte, hg. Max Kreutzberger, Tel Aviv: Bitaon Verlag, 1957, p. 127.
48. Op. cit, p. 130.
49. “Selbstmo¨rderische Politik”, “ein vielfa¨ltig nationals Problem und muß gleichfalls mit interna-
tionalen Machtmitteln sorgfa¨ltig behandelt und schließlich gelo¨st werden. Die Aliya Chadascha. ist
daher gegen den vielfach – resigniert, oder allzu sebstbewußt –herrschenden zionistischen Isola-
tionismus.” Op. cit, pp. 131-132.
50. “die Respektierung des arabischen Volkes”; “Nicht politische Herrschaft u¨ber Araber, sondern
gro¨ßte Kolonisation von Juden ist unser Ziel”; “daß wir keinen arabischen Bauer und keinen arabis-
chen Arbeiter verdra¨ngen und nicht die arabische Autonomie einschra¨nken wollen, sondern daß es
unser Zeil ist, neue und zusa¨tzliche Wirtschaftspositionen zu schaffen und unsere Rechte fu¨r uns
auf den von uns erschossenen Bo¨den zu suchen.” Op. cit, p. 134.
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been indefatigable in its side effects to prevent an irreparably widening breach
with England, since it maintains that in the long run, Anglo-Jewish co-
operation is inevitable. As far as the home policy is concerned, Aliyah Hadasha
has formulated a progressive programme and has proposed a series of internal
reforms in the Yishuv.51
Landauer was concerned about a growing “Zionist Totalitarianism” by autumn
1946 and by the spring of 1947, the organization continued to oppose the
partition of Palestine in favor of a federated Binationalist solution.52 Later that
year, the organization split into two factions. Landauer represented the minor-
ity position that advocated a single federated Palestine and Pinchas Rosen led
the majority to endorse partition, presumably two states and “federal ties
with the future Arab state.”53 In the first communal elections after the decla-
ration of an independent State of Israel, Aliyah Hadashah decided against field-
ing candidates and by December 1948, Landauer called for the organization to
dissolve.54
Arendt’s attitude to Aliyah Hadashah was decidedly negative, although their
views were remarkably close on a number of key points. It was the first time,
she argued, that the Zionist movement had produced an organization based on
“tribal differences, which have split the unity of the Jewish people for more
than 150 years.”55 The lessons of the previous ten years, 1934–1944, taught
that “the fate of the Jewish people is one and indivisible.”56 With an aware-
ness of the Irish emigration to New York, she argued that a German-Jewish
faction in Palestine was as sensible as forming an Irish party to represent its
separate interests in the United States. All of these trends – the failure to
endorse the Jewish army and its subsequent polarization to the right, the Bilt-
more program with its rejection of compromise and the organization of Zion-
ism along ethnic lines (a trend that was to continue well into the future) –
precipitated a “weakening of the authority of the Jewish Agency.” Arendt con-
cluded:
The challenges to the authority of our supreme governing body come from very
different quarters – the Magnes [Ihud] declaration and the Jewish Army Com-
mittee [the Revisionists] might be regarded as their most extreme poles. It is
significant, however, that both break rank with the official Zionist organiza-
tion; both by different means try to address the Jewish people over the heads
of Jewish officials, and neither tries to fight its battles within the established
administration.57
51. (Luft 1994), pp. 22-32. See also (Avineri 1991).
52. “zionistischen Totalitarismus”; Landauer in Mitteilungsblatt, Tel Aviv, 25 October 1946.
53. Sasson (1998), p. 284.
54. Landauer in Mitteilungsblatt, Tel Aviv, 10 November 1948.
55. Arendt (2007), p. 333.
56. Op cit.
57. Arendt (2007), p. 334.
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The alternative to the national question, she suggested in a rather odd
passage, was the model of ethnic political autonomy in the Russian Revolution.
Yet in direct contrast to Lenin’s doctrine of The Right of Nations to Self-
Determination in which “the self-determination of nations means the political
separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an
independent national state,”58 Arendt wrote that “for the first time in modern
history, an identification of nation and state has not even been attempted” in
the Russian Revolution. It was a strange position for Arendt to take, since only
three years later she would begin work on the Origins of Totalitarianism with
its formidable critique of Bolshevism. For Arendt, the promise of a “federation
of peoples and nationalities, all of them having their own, if very restricted
rights, none of them privileged and none of them dominated,” seemed to be
an answer to the pending problem of partition and the creation of two tiny
warring states.59 There was something clearly desirable in a non-state solution
for Palestine, she maintained, for the link between nationhood and state was
outdated. Europe was in the process of shedding the concept of nationhood as
determined by the possession of the apparatus of the state, she argued, the
mode with which the self-determination of peoples was indelibly linked in the
nineteenth century. Rather prophetically, in the midst of arguably the most
racial and nationally informed war Europe had known, she wrote that a “feder-
ated Europe” was already on the horizon. All progressive peoples, whether
European or otherwise, “know that many problems could be solved with a fed-
eral government and with a constitution giving equal rights to each and every
nationality on the continent.”60 The reason that Jewish autonomous political
life was associated with the nation-state was, she argued, due to the fact that
Zionism was born with the concept of nationhood in the previous century
where freedom, in the guise of self-determination, was linked to definitive
boundaries, cultural and ethnic homogeneity, and majoritarian identity. The
weakness of Zionism in the twentieth century was not to have realized the
obsolescence of its ideology and its resulting inability to change. Arendt
concluded that it was precisely the changing nature of the concept of ethnic
and political freedom that Ihud, under Magnes’ leadership, had correctly
understood and that despite any immediate obstacles constituted a chapter
out of the political formulas of the future.61 The imperative of Jewish emigra-
tion from Europe, which met with strong opposition from the Arabs, was to be
the Achille’s heal of Ihud. Arendt:
58. Lenin (1972)
59. Arendt (2007), p. 335.
60. Arendt (2007), p. 335.
61. A few years later, in a letter from Magnes to Arendt, it is evident that they share a common
regard for the Federalist papers, the founding documents of the American Revolution, from which
a “great deal can be learned both as to substance and as to terminology from a reading of the Arti-
cles of Confederation of 1777.” See Magnes to Arendt, Letter 133, from 20 July 1948 in Goren
(1982), p. 503.
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Even the Magnes plan betrays the fact that it is built up entirely at our expense:
a binational state protected by an Arab federation is nothing less than minority
status within an Arab empire, and this empire is to be protected by an Anglo-
American alliance which, to safeguard the way to India, has to deal with and to
respect the majority – the Arabs – and not so tiny a minority as the Jews. Mag-
nes, too, thinks along the old lines of national states … [as his] federation is – in
contrast to a nation – made up of different peoples with equal rights … [but if]
realized would make out of Palestine one of our worst Galuth [exile] countries.62
It is notable here that Arendt is never truly at home, even among what must
be considered her closest political allies in a moment of Zionist radicalization
by her own reckoning. But it is also, from another view, an indication of her
constantly developing position, particularly with regard to the “Arab question.”
Admittedly, she expressed some skepticism toward a federated solution as early
as October 1942, citing the American Zionist leader Emanuel Neumann (1893–
1980) who voiced the argument at Biltmore that federalism was a British impe-
rial campaign entirely suited to Pan-Arab nationalism, itself an “invention of
British power politics.”63 She essentially argued that there were two forms of
federalism: a colonial system of mutual animosity managed by the British, later
an Anglo–American alliance, and a truer form of federalism which could main-
tain ethnic and cultural differences as units of political self-organization with-
out succumbing to either isolationism, Balkanization or the politics of the
majority. The politics of Herzl, which was focused on a Jewish national home in
a Jewish nation-state, needed to give way to a new federal structure that was
able to take into account the troublesome nature of European national identity
politics. The identity politics of Europe continued to inform the current war. It
was also the impetus behind the impending collapse of British mandate Pales-
tine – the weight of an imperial empire about to buckle under the centrifugal
force of ethnic self-determination. Implicitly commenting on the position of
Ihud, which called for a “union of the free peoples” of Palestine and Britain,
she wrote that no one could know if the British commonwealth would be capa-
ble of accepting people of non-British origin into its political ranks. The out-
come could be a state of exile no greater than the states in which the Jews
already existed as a minority, beholden to the greater powers under which they
lived. Federation in Palestine actually meant neither the Leninist federation of
ethnic nation-states with the force of “Mother Russia” as its guide, nor the Brit-
ish franchise of imperial power. It meant neither partition, with weak indepen-
dent states in Balkanized isolation, nor federation under pan-Arab nationalism
where the Jews would remain a minority. Her vision of federalism meant politi-
cal units of regional and ethnic autonomy working in a cooperative framework,
avoiding minority rights or isolationism. That would be the politics of suicide,
she once wrote to the Zionist leader and intimate friend Kurt Blumenfeld.64
62. Arendt (2007), p. 336.
63. Arendt (2000), p. 102; Arendt (2007), p. 179.
64. Arendt to Blumenfeld on January 14, 1946 in Arendt and Blumenfeld (1995), p. 39.
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Zionism Reconsidered
By 1944, Arendt’s Zionism had been shaped considerably by the events of the
previous three years following her arrival in New York. In many respects, it
was a period of political setbacks, disappointments, and outright worries.
First, the Jewish Agency’s failure to back an independent Jewish army, the
idea taken over by the revisionist wing of the Zionist movement; second, the
rejection of Arab concerns and the explicit turn toward a single Jewish state
at Biltmore in May 1942; thirdly, the resistance to partition by Ihud, which
risked a Jewish minority in a federated Palestine under Arab-British control,
and by Aliyah Hadashah, which organized itself as a central European minority
culture within the yishuv and thus opened up the possibility of ethno-political
fracturing. In the period 1944–1946, Arendt entered a very intensive writing
phase, which included “extra-honorariums” from Jewish and “non-Jewish jour-
nals” to make her observations on Zionism known and to “propagate the
cause,” as she suggested in a letter to Kurt Blumenfeld.65 In October 1944, she
began work on an article which later appeared in the Jewish humanist Menorah
Journal under the title “Zionism Reconsidered” (Autumn 1945). This is one of
the most extensive of her writings on Zionism, and it demonstrates the
vibrant, changing nature of her thinking on Jewish politics at the time.66
The turning point for Arendt was first Biltmore, but then the reiteration of
the same demands by the World Zionist Organization at a conference in Atlan-
tic City in October 1944: the “whole of Palestine, undivided and undimin-
ished.” 67 From May 1942 to October 1944, the Arabs no longer featured in its
resolutions, leaving them arbitrarily “the choice between voluntary emigration
or second-class citizenship.”68 In these two fateful years, the Jewish Agency
and the majority of the Zionist movement had assumed a position that was
“identical with those of the extremists,” a terrible blow to “those Jewish par-
ties in Palestine” who had tirelessly campaigned for Jewish–Arab understand-
ing.69 With a certain degree of foresight and premonition concerning the terms
of what would eventually become the Arab–Israeli conflict, she predicted that
the Zionist movement would have to resort to the use of violence in the crea-
tion of a Jewish state, having done its best to create the conditions of a “tra-
gic conflict” that can only be solved by “cutting the Gordian knot:” the
displacement of the Palestinian Arabs.70 This descent of Zionism into the poli-
tics of population transfer signaled the decline of the self-determination move-
ment of the Jewish people as an independent force and the grounds of a new
Jewish politics. The framework for Jewish politics had been replaced by a
65. Arendt to Blumenfeld, op cit., p. 36.
66. See the particularly thoughtful presentation in Chapter 5 of Richard J. Bernstein (1996).
67. Arendt (2007), p. 343.
68. Op cit.
69. Op cit.
70. Op cit.
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nationalism that in many ways continues to have direct relevance for the poli-
tics of Israel today. As she wrote then:
Nationalism is bad enough when it trusts in nothing but the rude force of the
nation. A nationalism that … depends on the force of a foreign nation is cer-
tainly worse. This is the threatened fate of the Jewish nationalism and of the
proposed Jewish state, surrounded inevitably by Arab states and Arab peoples.
Even a Jewish majority in Palestine – nay, even a transfer of all Palestine
Arabs, which is openly demanded by the Revisionists – would not substantially
change a situation in which Jews must either ask protection from an outside
power against their neighbors or come to a working agreement with their
neighbors.71
Revisionism was founded not only on the demand for independence – they
were the only ones, Arendt noted, willing to raise a Jewish army – but also on
the exclusive right of the Jewish people to Palestine.72 For these views, the
revisionist movement was deemed fascist not only by Arendt but also by the
mainstream Zionist leadership of the 1930s and 1940s.73 They were the first to
claim “the whole of Palestine and Transjordan” and to “advocate the transfer
of Palestine Arabs to Iraq,” and yet with the turn of the wider Zionist move-
ment toward the nation-state and away from the idea of a national homeland,
the Revisionists had “proven victorious.”74 The victory of Revisionism could be
traced back to the origins of Zionism in two parallel European political ideolo-
gies of the nineteenth century: socialism and nationalism. The socialist ele-
ment in Zionism was prevalent among the first Jewish pioneers and
represented a large contingent among the first waves of emigration, or Aliyah,
from the 1880s to 1923. The movement had strong “Tolstoyan” affinities, she
wrote, offering presumably a more palatable word for “anarchism” or “liber-
tarian socialism” to the largely American readers of the Menorah Journal. The
Chalutz or pioneer movement was deeply interwoven with the agrarian cooper-
atives, or Kibbutzim, as an integral part of the development of a Jewish home-
land. But the curious aspect of this movement was their belief in what she
termed “a kind of personal salvation through work,” and thus an anti-political
orientation to the questions facing the yishuv.75 When the Jewish Agency,
“against the natural impulses of the whole Jewish people,” decided to “flood
the Palestine market with German products and thus make a mockery of the
boycott against German-made goods, they found little opposition in the Jewish
71. Arendt (2007), p. 344.
72. Originally made in error by Young-Bruehl (1982, 1st ed., p. 456) and repeated by Said (1995). It
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ported Meir Kahana or his JDF. This is an opportunity to correct a spurious claim that Arendt sup-
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national homeland, and least of all among its aristocracy, the so-called Kibutz-
niks.”76 Here Arendt was referring to the program to exchange goods for hard
currency, an earlier phase of the Nazi program to make German Jews pay for
their own rescue. It is quite evidently absurd to lay blame for the program and
its moral turpitude at the doorstep of the cultural socialist movement, since
neither the Kibbutzim nor the cultural Zionists could bear any tangible respon-
sibility for the decisions of the Jewish Agency. Her criticism, however, was
aimed at their lack of political action. In her view, the movement constituted
a cultural elite that remained aloof from politics and entered into a world
unaffected by the pressing issues and the emerging nation-state that it did not
support but did little to stop. By rejecting politics, the broadly libertarian
socialist element of the early Zionist movement ceded the sphere of politics to
the Jewish Agency, which, in turn, refused the call for independent military
action in Europe and abandoned Arab–Jewish reconciliation in Palestine. The
arrangement under which German Jews could buy their freedom by selling Ger-
man goods in Palestine is but one “instance among many of the political failure
of the aristocracy of Palestine Jewry.”77 The term aristocracy is obviously
polemical but at the same time reveals a certain degree of intimacy. Though
they were small in number, the libertarian cultural and socialist movement
exerted a disproportional influence on the social values in Palestine. Yet it
contributed remarkably little by way of politics. By failing to make good on
their political ideas and by restricting themselves to the agrarian and cultural
realm, the intellectual aristocracy of the Zionist movement were invariably
saddled with a political organization that they held in contempt, “as they held
in contempt all men who were not producing and living from the work of their
hands.” Similar to their European counterparts of the socialist movement many
of which “have, in the old tradition, simply refused to vote,” the anarchism of
this intellectual, cultural and socialist elite rejected the political.78 Revolu-
tionary as they were with regard to their ideology and social experimentation,
“they failed to level a single criticism at the Jewish bourgeoisie outside of Pal-
estine or to attack the role of Jewish finance in the political structure of Jew-
ish life.”79 With a rising tone of desperation, she concluded:
Thus the social revolutionary Jewish national movement, which started half a
century ago with ideals so lofty that it overlooked the particular realities of
the Near East and the general wickedness of the world, has ended – as do
most such movements – with the unequivocal support not only of national but
of chauvinist claims, not against the foes of the Jewish people but against its
possible friends and present neighbors.
76. Arendt (2007), p. 350.
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This voluntary and, in its consequences, tragic abdication of political leader-
ship by the vanguard of the Jewish people left the course free to the … politi-
cal Zionists. Their Zionism belongs to those nineteenth-century political
movements that carried ideologies, Weltanschauung[en], keys to history, in
their portmanteaus.80
The failure of the libertarian socialist wing of Zionism led Arendt to speculate
on the reasons for its demise well before the establishment of a state. Though
“Zionism Reconsidered” was written while the gas chambers were working at
maximum capacity, it is unlikely that her perspective on the ideological origins
of Zionism would have substantially changed by the end of the war and the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Zionism, for Arendt, was a Euro-
pean ideology that began in the European Kulturkampf of the nineteenth cen-
tury and at the crossroads of nationalism and socialism. Herzl’s ideology of the
eternality of Antisemitism made this crossroads particularly difficult for the
Jews to cross. Neither nationalism nor socialism would offer a complete solu-
tion. Under Herzl’s guidance, Zionism chose the isolation of Jewish nationalism
from the national struggles of other European peoples with whom they had a
natural alliance. In place of sharing common ground with other national identi-
ties, Zionism advances a route to independence for the Jews through an alli-
ance of imperialism. Herzl was characteristically unmoved by the suffering of
other small nations, thinking remarkably little about the solidarity between
nations and instead sought the patronage of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
empires. Upon hearing of the plight of the Armenians during the uprising and
massacres of 1894–1896 (the Hamidian massacres), he is reputed to have
remarked: “This will be useful for me with the Sultan.”81 Herzl was eager to
use the Armenian crisis as an opportunity to show the devotion of the Zionist
movement to the Ottoman Empire, as he testified in a letter to the Turkish
ambassador in Vienna.82 A standard was thereby set by which no noticeable
“solidarity with other peoples, whose cause … was essentially the same,” was
to be expressed by the Zionist leadership, though certainly not the only possi-
ble course for Zionism.83 The other road, the road not taken but perhaps more
obvious, “would have meant an alliance with all progressive forces in Europe.”
Though morally and intellectually advantageous, such an approach would have
had its risk. The “only man within the Zionist Organization known to have ever
considered [an anti-imperialist alliance for the Zionist movement] was the
great French Zionist Bernard Lazare … and he had to resign from the Organiza-
tion at the early date of 1899.”84
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It is surprising in retrospect how unpopular the anti-imperialist cause was
among the Zionists, since an alliance of this sort would seem rather self-evi-
dent, Zionism being the ideology of one national movement among numerous
struggling national minorities of Europe. One can only speculate that with the
emerging Cold War, which was already evident in the Wilson-Lenin competing
doctrines of self-determination, the Jews, well acquainted with Mother Russia,
would have seen through Lenin’s approach as a foil for the primacy of Russian
nationhood. In the course of the nineteenth century, imperialism proved to be
a “nation-destroying force, and therefore for a small people, it was near sui-
cide to attempt to become its ally or its agent.”85 Arendt’s metaphors are all
notably catastrophic: imperialism aids the self-determination of a people like
rope aids in hanging; an alliance of lamb and lion with “disastrous conse-
quences for the lamb.”86 Zionism, in her estimation, was doomed to failure if
it sought national self-determination under the wings of an imperial power.
Conclusion
Arendt’s critique of Zionism point to the question of why Zionism failed to
achieve natural allies and sought instead partnerships with the lions. Its
national idea, she wrote, was largely influenced by German nationalism, itself
missing a vital element found in the national revolutions of France, Italy and
also America: the concept of the sovereignty of the people. Zionism, under Her-
zl’s leadership, was never bothered with notions of popular sovereignty, not
having had the need to overthrow a landed aristocracy and a clerical class of
priests for nearly 2000 years. Sovereignty of the volonte´ ge´ne´rale, which Arendt
termed the “prerequisite for the formation of a nation” – and if not a nation
then certainly a nation-state – was missing from the Zionist idea.87 It was as if
the Zionists would adopt elements of the European struggle for self-determina-
tion without its historical framework. “It was precisely because of this national-
ist misconception,” she concluded, that the Zionists ended up making “Jewish
national emancipation entirely dependent upon the material interests of
another nation,” namely the Austrians, the Ottomans, and finally the British
Empire.88 Zionism was simply unprepared for the real questions it would face in
Palestine, or for that matter anywhere in which a Jewish state was contem-
plated: how to form a natural, working arrangement with those peoples (of Pal-
estine, Argentina, or Uganda) who currently resided under the force of a
colonial power. To extrapolate from the ideology of Herzl, the choice of Pales-
tine meant a choice of one or two roads: empire or federation, the former lay-
ing the groundwork for eventual conflict, the latter giving “the Jewish people,
85. Arendt (2007), p. 364.
86. Op cit.
87. Arendt (2007), p. 367.
88. Op cit.
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together with other small peoples, a reasonably fair chance for survival.”89 In
summing up her critique of the politics of imperialism, she concluded that the
Jews propose to establish … a “sphere of interest” [a colony] under the delu-
sion of nationhood. Either a binational Palestine state or a Jewish common-
wealth might conceivably have been the outcome of a working agreement with
[the] Arabs and other Mediterranean peoples … The erection of a Jewish state
within an imperial sphere of interest may look like a nice solution … [but] in
the long run, there is hardly [a] course imaginable that would be more danger-
ous.
“Zionism Reconsidered,” or perhaps more accurately “Zionism Reconsider!”
was an appeal to the Zionist movement. Arendt debated the merits of cultural
and political Zionism and its contribution to Jewish politics. She shaped a Zion-
ism for herself that stood between the aloofness of the cultural and agrarian
Zionism, on the one hand, and the imperialism of the political Zionism, on the
other. Her Zionism was an attempt to shape a Jewish politics under the given
conditions of a mortal enemy in Europe and a growing conflict with the Arab
Palestinians. Pierre Bouretz has raised the question of whether Arendt’s criti-
cism of Zionism suffered from the very distance to events on the ground that
she rejected, giving her predictions a “caracte`re improbable” and her observa-
tions from New York an easier task.90 Anticipating these views, Amnon Raz-
Krakotzkin argued that Arendt’s ideas on Zionism became unrealistic at the
very moment when reality proved her observations to be “correct and pre-
cise,” that she “became irrelevant when what she foresaw came to be real.”91
By this point in her career, as a “special delegate of the Jewish Agency for Pal-
estine,” she appeared to have no natural constituency. With the establishment
of the State of Israel and the death of Magnes in 1948, the idea of federalism
appeared a wistful solution, a fair and equitable partition of Palestine remote,
and war, as well as the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, a reality.
With this, her interest in Jewish politics declined and her attention was drawn
to other matters in political philosophy, on the relationship between thought
and action, the idea of judgment and moral responsibility in the wake of the
Holocaust.
Notes on contributor
Eric Jacobson (Department of Humanities, University of Roehampton) was born in
New York and received a doctorate from the Free University of Berlin. He is the
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89. Arendt (2007), p. 372.
90. Bouretz (2004).
91. Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “Binationalism and Jewish Identity” in Aschheim (2001), p. 169. See
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22 JACOBSON
References
Arendt, Hannah (1951) Antisemitism: Part One of the Origins of Totalitarianism,
Harvest/HBJ Book, New York, NY.
Arendt, Hannah (1957) Rahel Varnhagen Lebensgeschichte einer deutschen Ju¨din aus
der Romantik, Piper Verlag, Mu¨nchen.
Arendt, Hannah (1958) The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Arendt, Hannah (1994) Essays in Understanding 1930–1954, Schocken Books, New York,
NY.
Arendt, Hannah & Blumenfeld Kurt (1995) In Keinem Besitz verwurzelt. Die Korrespon-
denz. Hg. Ingeborg Nordmann und Iris Pilling, Rotbuch Verlag, Hamburg.
Arendt, Hannah (2000) Vor Antisemitismus ist man nur noch auf dem Monde sicher.
Beitra¨ge fu¨r die deutsch-ju¨dische Emigrantenzeitung “Aufbau” 1941–1945, Piper
Verlag, Mu¨nchen.
Arendt, Hannah (2002) Vita activa oder Vom ta¨tigen Leben, Piper Verlag, Mu¨nchen.
Arendt, Hannah (2005) Ich will verstehen: Sebstausku¨nfte zu Leben und Werk, Piper
Verlag, Mu¨nchen.
Arendt, Hannah (2007) Jewish Writings, Schocken Books, New York, NY.
Aschheim, Steven E. (2001) Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, University of California Press,
Berkeley, CA.
Avineri, Shlomo (1991) Arlosoroff, Grove Press, New York, NY.
Bernstein, Richard J. (1996) Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Bouretz, Pierre (November 2004) ‘Hannah Arendt et le sionism: Cassandre aux pieds
d’argile’ in, Raisons Politiques, vol. 16.
Brinner, William M. & Rischin, Moses (1987) Like All the Nations? The Life and Legacy
of Judah L. Magnes, State University of New York, Albany, NY.
Brown, Nancy. (2000) Outside the Law: Conscience, Conflict and Contradiction in Mar-
seilles 1940–1942 in The Century of Genocide, p. 49, from the 30th Annual Scholars
Conference on the Holocaust and the Churches convened 4–7 March 2000 in Philadel-
phia, PA. http://www.aschc.org/conference-archives/items/show/8 (accessed 4 July
2011).
Buber, Martin, Magnes, J. L. & Simon, E. (eds) (1947) Toward Union in Palestine: Essays
on Zionism and Jewish-Arab Cooperation, Ihud (Union) Association, Jerusalem.
Buheiry, Marwan R. (1977) ‘Theodor Herzl and the Armenian Question’, Journal of Pal-
estine Studies, vol. 7, no. 1.
Goren, Arthur A. (1982) Dissenter in Zion: From the Writing of Judah L. Magnes,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Heller, Joseph (2003) Mi-berit shalom le-Ih ud: Yehudah Lib Magnes vehamaavak
lemedinah du-leumit, Magnes Press, Jerusalem.
Jacobson, E. (2009) ‘Locating the Messianic: In Search of Causation and Benjamin’s Last
Message’, Journal for Cultural Research, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 207–223.
Kotzin, Daniel P. (2010) Judah L. Magnes: An American Jewish Nonconformist, Syracuse
University Press, Syracuse.
Landauer, Georg (1957) Alija Chadascha: Eine neue politische Formation in Der Zionis-
mus im Waldel dreier Jahrzehnte, hg. Max Kreutzberger, Bitaon Verlag, Tel Aviv.
Laqueur, Walter (2003) A History of Zionism, Tauris Paperbacks, London.
Lenin, V. I. (1972) The Right of Nations to Self-Determination in Collected Works, vol.
20, Progress Publishers, Moscow.
Luft, Gerda (1947) ‘Jewish Palestine Today: The Social and Political Background’ in
Buber, Martin, Magnes, J. L. & Simon, E. (eds.), Towards Union in Palestine, pp. 22–
32.
ARENDT ON PALESTINE 23
Magnes, Judah L. (1930) Like All the Nations?, Weiss Press [Herod’s Gate], Jerusalem.
Magnes, Judah L. (1939) The Bond: Pamphlets of the Group ‘The Bond’, Jerusalem, vol.
1, Rubin Mass, Jerusalem.
Magnes, Judah L. (1945) Jewish Arab Co-Operation in Palestine [Union Pamphlets No. 3],
Ihud (Union) Association, Jerusalem.
Magnes, Judah L. (1947) “A Solution Through Force”, in Buber, M., Magnes, J. L.,
Simon, E. (eds.), Toward Union in Palestine: Essays on Zionism and Jewish-Arab
Cooperation, Ihud (Union) Association, Jerusalem.
Magnes, Judah L & Martin, Buber (1947) Arab-Jewish Unity: Testimony before the
Anglo-American Inquiry Commission for the Ihud (Union) Association, Victor Gol-
lancz, London.
Medzini, M. (1928) Esser shanim shel mediniut eretz yistraelit, Tel Aviv.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul (1983) A Land of Two Peoples. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mose`s, Ste´phane (2009) The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem, Stanford
University Press, Stanford, CA.
Piterberg, Gabriel (2007) ‘Zion’s Rebel Daughter: Hannah Arendt on Palestine and Jew-
ish Politics’, New Left Review 48, Nov–Dec 2007, pp. 39–57.
Said, Edward (1995) The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-
Determination, 1969-1994, Vintage, London.
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948) Anti-Semite and Jew, Schocken Books, New York, NY.
Schechtman, Joseph (2007) “Revisionists, Zionist” in Encyclopaedia Judaica. 2nd edn,
Vol. 17. Detroit, Macmillan.
Sofer, Sasson (1998) Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Villa, Dana. R. (1996) Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Yakira, Elhanan (2006) ‘Hannah Arendt, the Holocaust, and Zionism: A Story of a Fail-
ure’, Israel Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 31-61.
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth (1982, 1st ed; 2004, 2nd ed.) For Love of the World, Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, CT.
24 JACOBSON
